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CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND RISK-AVOIDANCE
RULES IN JUDICIAL ETHICS
W. Bradley Wendel*
INTRODUCTION
To a large extent, our legal system relies on the professionalism of
individual judges to safeguard against the risk that campaign contribu-
tions will create a financial conflict of interest that undermines the
judiciary’s impartiality.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Caperton creates the possibility of due process challenges to judicial
conflicts of interest, but as the majority repeatedly emphasized, only
in extraordinary circumstances, when a contribution has a “significant
and disproportionate influence” on the judge’s decision.1  This Article
argues that it may be necessary to expand Caperton-style disqualifica-
tion proceedings to a wider range of circumstances for reasons of
behavioral ethics.  Well-understood, predictable psychological mecha-
nisms create “blind spots” in which the effect of a conflict of interest is
not apparent to someone subject to it.2  The effect of campaign contri-
butions on judges’ perceptions of bias is often unconscious.3  To make
matters worse, judges also remain unaware of their unawareness4 re-
sulting in a persistent and difficult-to-dispel illusion of objectivity.
Judges, like other professionals, believe their ethical commitments are
sufficient to withstand the bias effects of external factors, such as fi-
nancial conflicts of interest.
* Professor of Law, Cornell University.  The author gratefully acknowledges the research
funding provided by the Judge Albert Conway Memorial Fund for Legal Research, established
by the William C. and Joyce C. O’Neil Charitable Trust.
1. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009).
2. MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO DO WHAT’S
RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2011); Dolly Chugh et al., Bounded Ethicality as a Psycho-
logical Barrier to Recognizing Conflicts of Interest, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CHALLENGES
AND SOLUTIONS IN BUSINESS, LAW, MEDICINE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 74 (Don A. Moore et al.
eds., 2005); Paul Thagard, The Moral Psychology of Conflicts of Interest: Insights from Affective
Neuroscience, 24 J. APPLIED PHIL. 367 (2007); John M. Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psy-
chology of Contagious Organizational Corruption, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1177 (2005); Ann M. Ten-
brunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception in Unethical Behavior,
17 SOC. JUST. RES. 223 (2004); Don A. Moore & George Loewenstein, Self-Interest, Automatic-
ity, and the Psychology of Conflict of Interest, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 189 (2004).
3. Chugh et al., supra note 2, at 83.
4. Id. at 81.
255
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Judges may sincerely believe, as did the judge whose financial con-
flicts of interest were at issue in Caperton, that they can set aside the
bias resulting from campaign contributions.  Indeed, they should be
committed to principles of professionalism that include deciding cases
impartially.  The regulation of judicial ethics also assumes that, for the
most part, judges’ impartiality can be sustained by judges themselves,
who are able to separate their ethical duties from any personal attach-
ments or interests they may have.  It is easy to find numerous cases
relying upon the presumption that a “judge will put personal beliefs
aside and rule according to the laws as enacted, as required by his or
her oath.”5  I do not mean to doubt the genuineness of those judges’
who perform their duties in accordance with their oath of office.  The
concern here is not with intentional wrongdoing, such as judges ac-
cepting bribes in exchange for their decisions.6  Rather, this Article
focuses on the unconscious effect of financial largesse from interested
third parties.  By analogy, I believe most people have an intuition that
physicians try to sincerely do what is in the best interests of their pa-
tients, yet empirical evidence has shown that gifts to physicians from
pharmaceutical companies affect prescribing behavior at an uncon-
scious level.7  One could be concerned about the effect of gifts without
assuming that doctors are consciously and intentionally deciding to do
something unethical.  Unintentional and unconscious self-serving bi-
ases may distort judgment, and ironically be even more pernicious be-
cause of the psychological mechanisms that seek to sustain our self-
image as “moral, competent, and deserving.”8  Oaths of office, ethical
commitments, and professionalism by contrast are processed differ-
ently, operate through different mechanisms, and therefore may be
ineffective to combat contributors’ attempts to influence judicial deci-
sions.9  “[W]hen professional responsibilities clash with self-interest,
the two motives tend to be processed differently: Self-interest exerts a
more automatic influence than do professional responsibilities, which
are more likely to be invoked through controlled processing.”
5. In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194, 204 (2d Cir. 2000).
6. See, e.g., WILLIAM ECENBARGER, KIDS FOR CASH: TWO JUDGES, THOUSANDS OF CHIL-
DREN, AND A $2.6 MILLION KICKBACK SCHEME (2012) (detailing scandal from Luzerne County,
Pennsylvania, in which two judges accepted bribes to sentence children to terms in a for-profit
juvenile detention center).
7. Jason Dana & George Loewenstein, A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to Physicians
from Industry, 290 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 252 (2003) (reviewing empirical evidence on conflicts of
interest and concluding that self-serving bias is unintentional).
8. Chugh et al., supra note 2, at 81.
9. See Moore & Loewenstein, supra note 2, at 190.
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This Article proposes a decrease of the reliance on judges’ ethical
commitments and sense of professionalism and suggests shifting to a
model that more closely resembles the regulation of attorney conflicts
of interest.  Attorney conflicts rules seek to avoid multiple client rela-
tionships, personal interests, and other entanglements that present a
significant risk that the attorney may compromise her performance of
duties owed to the client, such as loyalty, diligence, confidentiality,
and independent professional judgment.10  This approach makes sense
because the conflicts provisions in state rules of professional conduct
are significantly redundant with duties inherent in the law of agency
and fiduciary relationships.  The attorney-client relationship is the
paradigmatic professional relationship that is characterized by a high
degree of dependence, trust, and reliance upon the lawyer to comply
with standards of conduct that exceed the morals of the market-
place.11  Conflicts rules regulate prophylactically, prohibiting certain
types of relationships that threaten to interfere with the performance
of the heightened duties owed by a fiduciary.
It seems odd to think of judges as fiduciaries since they differ from
lawyers in not having clients.  But fiduciary political theory views all
government officials, including judges, as having a position of public
trust which implies obligations to serve the interests of others.  Judges
do not serve constituents, as a legislator might, but act as a fiduciary
with respect to something else, such as the public interest or the law
itself.12  As the Supreme Court has said, “Judges are not politicians,
even when they come to the bench by way of the ballot.”13  The most
important policy goal of judicial ethics is to ensure judges’ fidelity to
the public trust and the impartial application of law.  That may re-
quire, in some cases, a broader scope of disqualification than would be
10. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 10.4, at 10–12 (3d ed.
& Supp. 2014) (noting that in modern attorney conflicts law, “a conflict of interest exists when-
ever the attorney-client relationship or the quality of the representation is ‘at risk,’ even if no
substantive impropriety—such as a breach of confidentiality or less than zealous representation—
in fact eventuates”) (emphasis in original); Kevin McMunigal, Rethinking Attorney Conflict of
Interest Doctrine, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 823 (1992). See also IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d
271, 280 (2d Cir. 1978) (foundational attorney conflicts case stating that “[t]he fact that a delete-
rious result cannot be identified subsequently as having actually occurred does not refute the
existence of a likelihood of its occurrence”).  I have argued for more openness to the attorney-
conflicts approach in judicial ethics, relying on the behavioral psychology literature discussed
here. See W. Bradley Wendel, The Behavioral Psychology of Judicial Corruption: A Response to
Judge Irwin and Daniel Real, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 35 (2010).
11. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 cmt. b (AM. LAW
INST. 2000).
12. See Ethan J. Leib et al., Mapping Public Fiduciary Relationships, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 388 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014).
13. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015).
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necessary absent the powerful unconscious effects of campaign
contributions.
II. PROFESSIONALISM AND THE ETHICAL COMMITMENTS
OF JUDGES
It is commonplace that, while lawyers must be zealous advocates for
their clients’ interests, judges must strive to be impartial.14  Justices of
the Supreme Court have frequently identified impartiality as the cen-
tral normative commitment of the judiciary.  In his confirmation hear-
ings, Chief Justice John Roberts famously analogized judges to
baseball umpires, who just call balls and strikes.15  Writing for the
Court in Caperton, Justice Kennedy defined the duty of a judge as
deciding cases based on “proper controlling factors” and not “some
personal bias or improper consideration.”16  And in the recent Wil-
liams-Yulee decision, Chief Justice Roberts elevated judicial impartial-
ity to the level of a compelling state interest, justifying some
restrictions on the solicitation of campaign funds by candidates for
judicial offices: “A State may assure its people that judges will apply
the law without fear or favor—and without having personally asked
anyone for money.”17  Two years after the Court’s Citizens United
case,18 Williams-Yulee distinguished judicial candidates from candi-
dates for representative offices.  Concurring in Williams-Yulee, Justice
Breyer wrote, “[u]nlike politicians, judges are not expected to be re-
sponsive to the concerns of constituents. . . . Instead, it is the business
of judges to be indifferent to popularity.”19
Numerous provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct, applicable to
state court judges, reinforce the ethical obligation of impartiality.20
14. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Impartial Judge: Detachment or Passion?, 45 DEPAUL L. REV.
605, 610–11 (1996) (describing ideal of detachment with reference to conduct and attitudes of
Justice O.W. Holmes, Jr.).
15. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005).
16. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883 (2009).
17. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015).
18. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
19. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1673–74 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
20. The American Bar Association first entered the field of judicial ethics in 1924 when it
promulgated the Canons of Judicial Ethics.  In the wake of the collapse of Abe Fortas’ nomina-
tion to the U.S. Supreme Court after the revelation of financial improprieties, the ABA formal-
ized the previously aspirational Canons in 1973 into an enforceable Code of Judicial Conduct,
revised in 1990, 2007, and 2011.  Revision by the ABA does not necessarily imply change at the
state level, so judges must consult the version of the Code of Judicial Conduct in effect in their
jurisdiction. See generally CHARLES GARDNER GEYH ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS
§1.03 (5th ed. 2013).  All states and the District of Columbia have established some type of
judicial conduct commission, which can investigate allegations of misconduct by judges and im-
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Judges are required to “uphold and apply the law” and to perform all
their judicial duties fairly and impartially.21  Judges are exhorted not
to be “swayed by public clamor or fear of criticism” and not to permit
external interests, including political and financial interests, to “influ-
ence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment.”22  These general duties
or aspirations are buttressed by more specific obligations of disqualifi-
cation or recusal.23  The Code states that a judge should disqualify
herself “in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might rea-
sonably be questioned.”24  The Code provides a non-exclusive list of
circumstances requiring recusal, but there is an overarching standard:
whether “an objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the
relevant facts would entertain a significant doubt” concerning the
judge’s impartiality.25
A. The Principle of Professionalism and the Duck-Hunting Case
Federal judges are subject to disqualification under a federal statute
when their impartiality may reasonably be questioned.26  One of the
most entertaining cases in judicial ethics arose out of litigation
brought by the Sierra Club and other plaintiffs seeking to obtain
records of a White House task force on energy policy headed by Vice
President Dick Cheney.  In the course of the litigation, some of the
parties sought the recusal of Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, after it
was revealed that he had gone on a duck-hunting trip with Cheney.27
pose appropriate sanctions.  In order to safeguard the independence of the judiciary, these com-
missions are controlled to a significant extent by judges.  Commission decisions are appealable to
a state court. See id. at §1.05.
21. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011) [hereinafter “MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT”].
22. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.4(A), (B).
23. The terms “recusal” and “disqualification” are used interchangeably in the Code of Judi-
cial Conduct. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.11 cmt. 1.
24. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.11(A).
25. GEYH, supra note 20, § 4.05.
26. 28 U.S.C. §455(a).  The statute applies to “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the
United States,” including Supreme Court Justices.  Recent controversy centers on whether the
Code of Conduct for United States Judges should be made applicable to the Supreme Court.
Some commentators have called for its extension to the Supreme Court, while Chief Justice
Roberts has resisted this expansion. See Lincoln Caplan, Does the Supreme Court Need a Code
of Conduct?, NEW YORKER (July 25, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/does-
the-supreme-court-need-a-code-of-conduct.
27. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004).  The Code of Conduct for United
States Judges and the federal recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012), are sources of guidance for
Supreme Court Justices but there is no mechanism for adjudicating recusal motions concerning
Justices. See James J. Alfini, Supreme Court Ethics: The Need for Greater Transparency and
Accountability, 21 PROF’L LAW. 10 (2012).  Thus, the request for Justice Scalia’s recusal was
directed to the Justice himself.  Justice Scalia chose to provide a memorandum explaining his
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Leaving aside more technical issues such as whether the lawsuit was
against Cheney in his personal or official capacity, and whether a
flight on a government-owned Gulfstream jet is really equivalent to
flying commercial, Justice Scalia focused his response on the asserted
reason for his recusal. The motion to recuse was based on the fact that
the hunting trip was evidence of an existing friendship between a
judge and a party to the litigation.  Friendships between Supreme
Court Justices and high-ranking government officials are historically
unremarkable, Justice Scalia argued.  Playing poker with presidents
was apparently a regular feature of social life for Justice Douglas and
Chief Justice Vinson, Justice White went skiing with then-Attorney
General Robert Kennedy and his family, and “Justice Stone tossed
around a medicine ball with members of the Hoover administration
mornings outside the White House”28—a practice I think we can all
hope to see revived.
Justice Scalia’s principal argument against recusal, however, was
that a judge must be presumed to be able to decide cases impartially,
notwithstanding certain other interests, relationships, loyalties, or
commitments:
The people must have confidence in the integrity of the Justices, and
that cannot exist in a system that assumes them to be corruptible by
the slightest friendship or favor[.]29
In other words, Justice Scalia should be presumed to have the capacity
to set aside whatever warm feelings he may have for Dick Cheney,
and any fond memories of freezing in a duck blind with him, and de-
cide the case on its merits.  The single-justice decision creates uncer-
tainty regarding the so-called duty to sit, which states that “[i]t is a
judge’s duty to refuse to sit when he is disqualified but it is equally his
duty to sit when there is no valid reason for recusation.”30  Recogni-
tion of a duty to sit has the effect of putting a judge’s own thumb on
the scale in opposition to disqualification.  The duty to sit in effect
shifts the burden of persuasion to the judge to become satisfied that
grounds exist for disqualification, as opposed to presuming that a con-
flict creates a reasonable appearance of bias.
decision not to recuse himself from the litigation; this is referred to as the single-Justice opinion
(or decision) in the case.
28. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 918.
29. Id. at 928.
30. Edwards v. United States, 334 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1964); see also GEYH, supra note 20, at
§ 4.07[4], 4–30 (suggesting that Justice Scalia’s opinion may have revived the duty to sit, which
had been abolished in the federal recusal statute in 1974); Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R.
Perschbacher, The Elusive Goal of Impartiality, 97 IOWA L. REV. 181, 202–03 (2011) (same).
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This stance by Justice Scalia can be referred to as the presumption
of professionalism. Professionalism in this sense refers to an ability or
disposition to set aside what would otherwise be considerations rele-
vant to a decision or action.  As a matter of everyday ethics, an ordi-
nary person named Nino Scalia, who is friends with someone named
Dick Cheney and has shared many enjoyable hunting trips with him,
would seek to protect his friend’s reputation from unjustified attacks.
But judges take an oath to uphold the Constitution and apply the law
impartially.  They are subject to the role-differentiated ethical de-
mands of the judicial office.31 Having assumed a professional role and
its associated normative commitments, Justice Scalia must be pre-
sumed to make a psychological effort to ignore the personal affection
he has for a party before him.32  The neutrality or setting aside of per-
sonal interests that is central to professionalism is familiar in many
domains of practical ethics.  Teachers know they must grade papers
and exams fairly, regardless of whether they are written by a delight-
ful student or an annoying one.  Lawyers are instructed that the repre-
sentation of a client does not imply agreement with the client’s
“political, economic, social or moral views or activities.”33  Moreover,
the ideal of professionalism seemed to be behind the controversy that
arose during the confirmation hearings for Supreme Court Justice
Sonia Sotomayor, after President Obama had said she would bring her
life experience and empathy to the Court.  Senator Jeff Sessions, then
the ranking Republican member of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
assailed empathetic judging as a failure of professionalism:
I will not vote for, and no senator should vote for, anyone who will
not render justice impartially . . . Call it empathy, call it prejudice,
or call it sympathy, but whatever it is, it’s not law . . . In truth, it’s
more akin to politics, and politics has no place in the courtroom.34
Sessions implied—wrongly in my view—that Sotomayor was confess-
ing to a lack of professionalism, rather than arguing for a more expan-
sive conception of judicial impartiality in which a judge can draw from
life experiences to find the best way to interpret the law.
31. See, e.g., TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF ROGUES? A DEFENCE OF THE STANDARD CONCEP-
TION OF THE LAWYER’S ROLE (2009) (explaining that role-differentiated morality can sometimes
impose heightened demands on occupants of social and institutional roles).
32. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (noting the ‘‘presumption of honesty and
integrity in those serving as adjudicators”).
33. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) [hereinafter “MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT”].
34. See Robert Barnes, Amy Goldstein & Paul Kane, In Senate Confirmation Hearings,
Sotomayor Pledges ‘‘Fidelity to Law”, WASH. POST (July 14, 2009), http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/13/AR2009071301154.html.
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B. Caperton and the Limits of Professionalism
Professionalism has its limits; otherwise there would be no need for
disqualification provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct.  In some
cases, it is implausible to believe that a judge is capable of setting
aside some outside interest, relationship, or commitment.  Indeed, the
Supreme Court has said that due process may demand more than a
professional commitment to set aside the biasing effects of financial
contributions to a state court judge’s election campaign.
In Caperton, the president of Massey Coal Company, Don Blanken-
ship, made a $2.5 million donation to a “dark money” organization
called, with painful bathos, “And For The Sake Of The Kids,” estab-
lished to oppose a sitting justice on the West Virginia Supreme Court
and support the challenger, Brent Benjamin.35  After winning the
election, the recipient of Blankenship’s largesse denied that the con-
tribution would affect the way he decided a pending appeal filed by
Massey Coal.  After careful consideration, Justice Benjamin wrote he
found “no objective information . . . to show that this Justice has a bias
for or against any litigant, that this Justice has prejudged the matters
which comprise this litigation, or that this Justice will be anything but
fair and impartial.”36  Then lo and behold, in a 3-2 decision, Justice
Benjamin was the deciding vote and the West Virginia Supreme Court
reversed the jury verdict against Massey.37  Subsequently, the Su-
preme Court reviewed a series of decisions involving Due Process
Clause challenges of judicial conduct that threatened impartiality.
The Court distilled this principle from the cases: Due Process may be
offended by a financial interest that “would offer a possible tempta-
tion to the average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance
nice, clear and true.”38  The issue was thus presented: Would the debt
of gratitude felt by Justice Benjamin to Don Blankenship for securing
his election to the West Virginia Supreme Court create a strong
enough temptation that he would be unable to “hold the balance nice,
clear and true”?
In answering this question, the Court accorded relatively little im-
portance to the presumption of professionalism relied upon by Justice
Scalia in Cheney v. U.S. District Court.  Justice Benjamin said he had
conducted an introspective analysis and found that he had no bias or
35. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 873 (2009).
36. Id. at 874.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 879, 885 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986) (quoting
Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927))).
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improper feelings of partiality toward Blankenship or Massey Coal.39
In other words, Justice Benjamin believed his professionalism was a
sufficient guarantee of his impartiality.  Based on Justice Scalia’s rea-
soning, this should be sufficient.  Interestingly, however, rather than
relying on professionalism alone, the Court chose to emphasize a legal
process consideration—the commitment of judges to elaborate on the
reasons for decisions in written opinions:
The judge inquires into reasons that seem to be leading to a particu-
lar result.  Precedent and stare decisis and the text and purpose of
the law and the Constitution; logic and scholarship and experience
and common sense; and fairness and disinterest and neutrality are
among the factors at work.  To bring coherence to the process, and
to seek respect for the resulting judgment, judges often explain the
reasons for their conclusions and rulings.  There are instances when
the introspection that often attends this process may reveal that
what the judge had assumed to be a proper, controlling factor is not
the real one at work.  If the judge discovers that some personal bias
or improper consideration seems to be the actuating cause of the
decision or to be an influence so difficult to dispel that there is a
real possibility of undermining neutrality, the judge may think it
necessary to consider withdrawing from the case.40
It is not just introspection that constrains potential bias, but the disci-
pline of giving a reasoned explanation.41  It may happen that a judge
finds an opinion just “won’t write,” as judges sometimes say.42  But if
it is possible to articulate defensible grounds for a decision, how can a
judge say whether bias was at work, or whether the decision was
reached on the basis of proper, controlling factors?  When evaluating
the ethics of judges, one of the hardest problems arises from the lack
of ex ante agreement on what the correct outcome of a judicial deci-
sion should be.  The decision reversing the jury verdict against Massey
Coal was 3-2, and Blankenship had not lavishly funded the election
campaigns of the other two justices.  There must have been some rea-
son supporting the decision, beyond Benjamin’s feelings of gratitude
toward Blankenship.  At the very least, it seems difficult to say that
voting with the majority is even prima facie evidence of bias.  Perhaps
the feasibility of giving a principled justification for one’s decision is a
sufficient basis for concluding the judge was not impermissibly biased,
39. Id. at 884.
40. Id. at 883.
41. See, e.g., GERALD J. POSTEMA, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE
COMMON LAW WORLD 135 (2011) (discussing the work of Edward Levi and Karl Llewellyn);
NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995).
42. See, e.g., MARTIN P. GOLDING, LEGAL REASONING 3 (2001).
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particularly given the strong commitment to impartiality that is char-
acteristic of assuming the role of judge.43
I do not mean to set up a straw-man position here.  I am generally
disposed to find reliable legal process constraints such as the require-
ment of furnishing a reasoned elaboration of a decision.  There are
numerous issues within judicial ethics, all of which implicate the value
of impartiality, of which the only sensible resolution is either reliance
on professionalism or legal process safeguards.  For example, a judge’s
religious commitments may appear to favor one party or the other in
cases involving reproductive rights, same-sex marriage, or capital pun-
ishment.44  Expense-paid gigs as speakers at legal-education seminars
sponsored by industries or think tanks in swanky resorts may leave
judges with a lingering fondness for the ideological point of view ex-
pressed by seminar organizers.45  Judges speak and write on topics of
public importance, sometimes before groups associated with a particu-
lar ideological agenda, and may be assumed by litigants or members
of the public to hold those views while deciding cases touching on the
same issues.  In some cases, an invitation to a meeting is extended
because of the judge’s record of support for a cause.46  Before taking
the bench a judge may have represented clients in private practice
who have strong attitudes or preferences regarding an area of law.  As
noted by Justice Scalia in Cheney, judges may be friends with political
officials or other litigants, and judges may also have spouses or other
family members who are identified with particular political or ideolog-
ical positions.47  Not only do these allegiances and entanglements not
constitute a due process violation, but depending on the circum-
43. See, e.g., Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function,
96 GEO. L.J. 1283 (2008).
44. See, e.g., Lisa Miller, Justice Scalia Speaks for Himself on Death Penalty, Not the Catholic
Church, WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2011) (describing Justice Scalia’s statements that he personally
believes capital punishment is morally permissible, and arguing that he wrongly believes the
Roman Catholic Church agrees with him).
45. See, e.g., Editorial, The Justices’ Junkets, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2011.
46. See, e.g., Kate Zirnike, Secretive Republican Donors are Planning Ahead, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 19, 2010) (reporting on a meeting of donors in Palm Springs to “develop strategies to
counter the most severe threats facing our free society and outline a vision of how we can foster
a renewal of American free enterprise and prosperity,” which was attended by Justice Scalia and
Thomas).
47. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas’s wife, Ginni, has long been involved in con-
servative political activism, including in a senior role in the Heritage Foundation, which lobbied
strenuously against the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).  The constitutionality of the ACA was
twice an issue before the Supreme Court.  Some have suggested that Ginni Thomas’ activism
should require Justice Thomas’ recusal in cases presenting issues on which his wife has taken a
strong position. See, e.g., Stephanie Mencimer, Is Ginni Thomas’ Expanding Activism a Problem
for Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas?, MOTHER JONES (July 26, 2013).
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stances, many of them do not require recusal under the Code of Judi-
cial Conduct.  The reason is that in many cases, we trust
professionalism and process constraints to be effective enough to sus-
tain public confidence in an impartial judiciary, even though these sit-
uations present potentially conflicting interests for the judge.
C. Attorney Conflicts Rules Do Not Rely Solely on Professionalism
Attorney conflicts of interest are handled very differently.  As
noted previously, the most important difference between judicial dis-
qualification rules and attorney conflicts is that the latter are charac-
terized by a “risk-avoidance” approach.48  For example, an attorney
would be prohibited from representing a co-party in civil litigation,
even where the parties’ interests are nominally aligned, if “there is a
significant risk that the representation of one” of the parties “will be
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to” the other
party.49  A comment to that rule clarifies that a conflict of interest
exists when there is a significant risk that the concurrent representa-
tion will materially limit the lawyer’s ability to “consider, recommend
or carry out an appropriate course of action” for one client due to
responsibilities owed to another client.50  A concurrent conflict of in-
terest can also arise from a lawyer’s responsibilities to a third party or
from the lawyer’s own interests, including financial interests.  The risk
of this interference must be significant, not merely speculative.  How-
ever, the crucial point of distinction here is that a commitment by a
lawyer to professionalism is not sufficient.  A lawyer may, in complete
and subjective good faith, believe herself able to disregard the interest
giving rise to the conflict and represent the client effectively.  But the
rules will not allow her to do this, without the informed consent of the
client.
Moreover, the enforcement of attorney conflicts rules does not sim-
ply rely on the professionalism of lawyers to protect clients from
harm.  Clients who believe the representation of another client or the
attorney’s own interests presents a substantial risk to their lawyer’s
undivided loyalty may enforce the protections of the conflicts rules
through motions to disqualify and actions for an injunction.  The
downsides for lawyers can be significant.  In one recent case a conflict
of interest created by a law firm merger resulted in the disqualification
of a large firm from a case in which it had earned $12 million in fees
48. See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.
49. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2).
50. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 8.
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that it was forced to disgorge.51  In another recent case, a law firm was
disqualified from a patent infringement case where the client had
hired away former in-house counsel of the alleged infringer.52  These
penalties tend to focus the attention of attorneys on conflicts of inter-
est and bring a secondary process of external scrutiny to bear on the
lawyer potentially laboring under a conflict.  Law firms have in-house
risk-management lawyers who attempt to avoid fiascoes such as these,
largely by developing and administering internal procedures for rec-
ognizing and handling conflicts.
There is really no comparable mechanism in judicial ethics.  Al-
though judges can be disciplined for failure to disqualify themselves in
appropriate cases, generally discipline will only be imposed for willful
violations.53  The failure of a judge to disqualify herself may also war-
rant remedial action by an appellate court, including reassignment to
another trial court judge on remand and possible reversal of the judg-
ment.54  However, these drastic remedies are rare.  As discussed in the
next Section, there are subtle framing effects in the differences be-
tween attorney conflicts rules and judicial disqualification rules.  Ad-
ditionally, judges are no different from other people in holding to a
self-conception as ethical and competent.  This self-conception tends
to interfere with the introspective process of determining when a po-
tential source of bias should be regarded as disqualifying.  Given the
reliance on individual professionalism—which requires judges to ei-
ther set aside biasing interests while deciding cases or identify disqual-
ifying conflicts as a basis for recusal—the behavioral psychology of
detecting and responding to conflicts of interest has potentially far-
reaching implications for judicial ethics.  In particular, financial sup-
port of judicial election campaigns by interested parties may not rise
to the level of a disqualifying conflict, at least for some judges.  It may,
however, create unconscious bias on the part of the judge.  The next
Section explains how a decent, honorable, well-intentioned judge,
fully committed to the ethical ideal of impartiality, may come to ac-
quire an unconscious bias in favor of one of the parties to a case pend-
51. Western Sugar Coop. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 98 F. Supp. 3d 1074 (C.D. Cal.
2015).
52. Dynamic 3D Geosolutions LLC v. Schlumberger Ltd., 837 F.3d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
53. See, e.g., In re Schenck, 870 P.2d 185, 189 (Or. 1994).
54. See, e.g., Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 2013) (disqualifying district
judge in litigation over city’s “stop and frisk” policy where judge’s statements to the media might
cause a reasonable observer to question her impartiality); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253
F.3d 34, 107–11 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (district court judge in antitrust case committed ethical viola-
tions that were “deliberate, repeated, egregious, and flagrant” by giving secret interviews to
reporters and making public statements about the pending litigation).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\67-2\DPL204.txt unknown Seq: 13 20-MAR-18 9:58
2018] JUDICIAL ETHICS 267
ing before the judge.  The existing law and procedure of judicial
disqualification is reasonably well suited to address conscious bias, but
must be modified to handle the threat to judicial impartiality posed by
unconscious bias.
III. THE BEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN
CONTRIBUTIONS
Before going deeper into the psychological aspect, it is important to
acknowledge a methodological issue that poses a challenge for judicial
ethics.  The difficulty is in specifying the baseline of an unbiased judi-
cial decision, or otherwise measure a judge’s deviation from what
other judges, not subject to a conflict of interest, might decide.  Con-
sider the case of medical ethics and the influence of gifts from phar-
maceutical companies.  The effect of a gift may be measured by
comparing the prescribing behavior of a group of physicians who re-
ceived gifts with those who have not.  A study showing greater fre-
quency of prescribing the drug produced by the benefactor company,
as compared with other physicians practicing who did not receive gifts,
indicates an effect resulting from the gift.55  There is a sizeable control
group of physicians that differs from the treatment group in one
way—they have not received a gift from a drug company.  It is much
more difficult to find a control to isolate the effect of a campaign con-
tribution or other conflict of interest on a judge’s decision.  In
Caperton, another pro-business judge might have also reversed judg-
ment in the plaintiff’s misrepresentation and tortious interference
claims, either on substantive or procedural grounds (the latter was the
basis for the West Virginia Supreme Court’s decision).56  As Jed
Shugerman correctly notes, judges tend to resist acknowledging the
legal realist observation that they may actually be “pro-business” or
“pro-consumer.”57  It seems reasonable to believe, however, that
there may be lower-court judges or lawyers in West Virginia who are
generally sympathetic toward businesses and might have ideas about
whether forum-selection clauses in contracts should be enforced.
Thus, they might have some preconceptions about how the underlying
state court litigation in Caperton should be resolved.58  They may
55. See Dana & Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 254.
56. The decision of the state court in which Justice Benjamin participated relied on a forum
selection clause and res judicata. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223 (W. Va.
2008).
57. Jed H. Shugerman, In Defense of Appearances: What Caperton v. Massey Should Have
Said, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 529, 538 (2010).
58. See CHRIS W. BONNEAU, A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE CONCERNING JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 5–6 (2012) (discussing difficulty of establishing causality from correlation measures,
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choose to run for an open position on the West Virginia Supreme
Court, attract campaign contributions from the President of Massey
Coal and, if elected, might rule in favor of the company.  Is a vote for
Massey Coal due to (1) the judge’s preexisting favorable attitude to-
ward forum-selection clauses; (2) the judge’s gratitude to Massey Coal
for its financial support or expectation of future financial support
from other energy companies; or (3) an independent, impartial judg-
ment that under West Virginia law, the forum-selection clause is
enforceable?
There are numerous studies showing that judges in general tend to
favor one party or another in decided cases (e.g., plaintiffs or defend-
ants, in-state or out-of-state litigants) or that some subset of judges
(e.g., those appointed by Republican or Democratic presidents) can
be associated with particular outcomes.59  A recent study specifically
took up the empirical issue underlying the Caperton decision and in-
vestigated the degree to which financing for judicial campaigns is asso-
ciated with judicial decisions favoring the interests of donors.60  The
authors imply the first answer to the above hypothetical is plausible—
i.e. that judges who are already disposed to vote in favor of business
interests will attract campaign financing from pro-business donors.61
In Caperton, Justice Benjamin’s vote is not likely explicable by a gen-
eral pro-business orientation because the plaintiff in that case was it-
self a business, and also in the coal-mining industry.  This fact may
simply heighten the perception that Caperton is an anomaly.
In a case where the influence of a campaign contribution is compa-
rably egregious, there may well be a violation of the Due Process
because contributors may support a judge who is already predisposed to take a liberal or con-
servative position).
59. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTI-
TUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Ideology “All the Way
Down”? An Empirical Study of Establishment Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts, 110 MICH.
L. REV. 1201 (2012); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2008); Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing
Guidelines: Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 715 (2008);
Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1457
(2003); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: Defend-
ants’ Advantage, 3 AM. L. ECON. REV. 125 (2001); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
Anti-Plaintiff Bias in the Federal Appellate Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 128 (2000); Alexander Tabar-
rok & Eric Helland, Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157
(1999); Stephen J. Ware, Politics, and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration Law in
Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL. 645 (1999); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship
and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE
L.J. 2155 (1998).
60. Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical Anal-
ysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69 (2011).
61. Id. at 72.
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Clause.  In more ordinary cases, it can be difficult to separate preexist-
ing attitudes and values from the effects of campaign contributions.
There are reasons to believe, however, that campaign contributions
have an effect over and above the influence of preexisting dispositions
to favor a particular class of litigants.  For example, while campaign
contributions from business groups are associated with a greater likeli-
hood that judges will favor business interests, pro-business judges who
are in their last term before mandatory retirement do not have the
same tendency to favor business interests.  This “lame duck effect”
suggests a causal relationship between campaign fundraising and judi-
cial decision-making.62  A follow-up study using the same data set
finds a similar influence on judicial decisions from contributions made
by groups that might be characterized as anti-business, such as labor
unions.63
Thus, there is at least some evidence of a causal relationship be-
tween receipt of campaign contributions, or the desire for future fi-
nancial support, and judicial decisions favorable to the contributor.
On its face this evidence appears to support the belief of many mem-
bers of the public that justice is for sale.64  However, the explanation
for the effect of campaign contributions on judicial decision-making is
not necessarily corruption, and certainly not as that word is under-
stood as a characterological defect.65  It may be in some cases, of
course, but the most plausible explanation for large-scale empirical
findings of a causal relationship between contributions and judges’ de-
cisions is unconscious bias.
A. Unconscious Effects on Ethical Decision-making
The starting point for this explanation is the now-familiar finding
that humans employ two parallel decision-making processes.  One is
fast, automatic, associative, relatively effortless, concrete, and uncon-
scious; the other is slow, deliberate, rule-based, effortful, sometimes
abstract, and conscious.66  The influence of the unconscious process
62. Id. at 75.
63. Michael Heise, The 2017 Monsanto Lecture: The Complicated Business of State Supreme
Court Elections: An Empirical Perspective, 52 VAL. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
64. See Charles Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 52 (2003) (reporting
that “roughly 80% of the public believes that when judges are elected, their decisions are influ-
enced by the campaign contributions they receive”).
65. See LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, CAPTURED BY EVIL: THE IDEA OF CORRUPTION IN LAW
(2013).
66. See, e.g., Thomas Gilovich & Dale W. Griffin, Judgment and Decision Making, in SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 542, 566 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2011); Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the
Bench:  How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6–9 (2007); Moore & Loewenstein,
supra note 3, at 190.  This research has been popularized by books by or about the pioneering
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results in departures from what might be expected if all decisions were
the product of the conscious, rational process.  Moreover, these depar-
tures are patterned and predictable.  Without being aware of it, we
tend to rely on cognitive shortcuts, known as heuristics, which speed
up decision-making but can lead to errors.  The modern biases-and-
heuristics literature is immense, but this Article draws from the impor-
tant subdiscipline of behavioral ethics, which studies the patterned
and predictable effects of unconscious psychological processes on ethi-
cal decision-making.
One can detect “bounded ethicality” when one sees an action that is
inconsistent with the actor’s conscious commitments or values.67
Along with Justice Scalia in Cheney and Justice Benjamin in Caperton,
judges sincerely assert their ability to judge cases impartially because
their role requires it.  Yet in some cases judges appear to have been
influenced and exhibit gratitude or favoritism toward a campaign con-
tributor.  The reason for this discrepancy is that unconscious percep-
tual and cognitive processes cause us to overlook or explain away
evidence that might lead the actor to recognize and avoid ethical
wrongdoing.
These blind spots are the result of a predictable and pervasive fea-
ture of ethical decision-making.  We begin with a conception of our-
selves as moral, competent, and deserving.68  People tend to
overestimate the degree to which they can make objectives decisions,
free from self-interest.  Thus, we believe a conflict of interest will not
distort our judgment.  Evidence shows that people believe themselves
to be better than others at a range of tasks, including negotiating, driv-
ing, cooperating, and decision-making.  Objective evidence can some-
times counteract this illusion of objectivity, for example when
someone who believes herself to be an above-average tennis player is
soundly beaten by a better opponent.  This gives rise to cognitive dis-
sonance with one’s prior belief, which may by necessity be overcome
psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. See, e.g., MICHAEL LEWIS, THE UNDOING
PROJECT: A FRIENDSHIP THAT CHANGED OUR MINDS (2016); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING,
FAST AND SLOW (2013); MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT
THINKING (2007); see also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
67. BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 2, at 5; see also Debra Lyn Bassett, Three Reasons
Why the Challenged Judge Should Not Rule on a Judicial Recusal Motion, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 659 (2015) (reviewing studies showing effects of unconscious mental processes, and
arguing that because judges are unaware of their effects, judges are not well-positioned to con-
sider motions to disqualify for bias); Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight, Behavioral
Legal Ethics, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1114–17 (2013) (reviewing research on ethical blind spots).
68. Chugh et al., supra note 2, at 81–86.
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by objective evidence. Ethical decision-making, however, involves
competencies for which objective evidence is less clear and available:
[A]ssessments of general beliefs such as one’s awareness of, concern
for, understanding of, and interest in environmental issues and
problems are difficult to confirm or disconfirm.  In contrast, assess-
ments of how well one performs on specific activities such as re-
cycling, donating money to environmental organizations, and using
energy-saving lightbulbs can be checked against objective
measures.69
The problem for ethical decision-making is that our belief that we pos-
sess above-average levels of honesty or fairness is less likely to be re-
vealed as inconsistent with objective data.70  To these experimental
findings can be added the observation made above: legal questions
often do not have clear, objectively verifiable right or wrong answers.
Unlike the soundly beaten tennis player, a judge on one side of a 3-2
decision is likely to assume only that she has one of two reasonable
views about how the case should have come out.  Thus, a judge in the
position of Justice Benjamin in Caperton has sufficient evidence to
believe that he acted competently, fairly, and free from any influence
of the contributions made in support of his campaign.  The ideology of
judicial neutrality, under which judges are sincerely committed to the
belief that they just call balls and strikes, also exerts a powerful fram-
ing effect that causes judges to construe a situation as not involving
ethical issues.71  The ethical dimensions of a situation are not as sali-
ent if there are external cues, such as the pervasive belief in the effi-
cacy of professionalism to ensure impartial judicial decisions, which in
turn affects the way a decision-maker construes facts.72
A judge’s belief that she is moral and competent may be reinforced
by the framing of a decision the judge is required to make.  Framing
effects are pervasive in cognitive psychology. The most familiar, par-
ticularly for readers familiar with the work of Kahneman and Tversky,
is the importance of whether a decision is framed as involving the pos-
sibility of a gain or loss.73 For example, when a sample of law students
were asked to role-play the plaintiff or defendant in a mock settle-
ment negotiation, they were given the following choices: Plaintiffs
were told they could accept a certain $200,000 settlement offer or take
69. Id. at 82.
70. Id. at 85.
71. Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 2, at 231–33.
72. See also Darley, supra note 3, at 1191–93 (noting that when someone commits to a group,
her first task is to become a prototypical member of the group, which may include adopting the
implicit or explicit moral perspectives of the group).
73. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 794–96 (2001) (discussing findings of Kahneman and Tversky).
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a 50% chance of winning $400,000 at trial (which of course carried a
corresponding 50% chance of obtaining nothing at trial); defendants
had the option of paying a $200,000 settlement to the plaintiffs or fac-
ing the same 50% chance of losing $400,000 at trial.  The investigator
found that 77% of plaintiffs preferred settlement, while only 31% of
defendants opted for settlement.74  The reason is that the plaintiffs
were choosing among options presenting gains, so they preferred the
risk-averse option; the defendants, who were choosing among losses,
preferred the risk-seeking alternative.  But the idea of framing is
broader than gains versus losses.  For example, whether something is
presented as an “ethical decision” or a “business decision” may affect
the likelihood that the parties behave unethically.75  In a famous
study, social psychologist Lee Ross and his colleagues asked subjects
to play a Prisoner’s Dilemma game, in which betraying the other
player is in one’s rational self-interest.76  While they all played the
same game, the twist was that half of the subjects were told they were
playing the “Community Game” and the other half that they were
playing the “Wall Street Game.”  When told they were playing the
Community Game, 70% of participants cooperated, even though it
was not in their self-interest; the results were precisely the opposite
for the Wall Street Game, with 70% behaving self-interestedly.77
It bears repeating that these processes operate unconsciously, with-
out the person subject to them being aware of their effect.78  As the
result of these unconscious processes, people are subject to what psy-
chologists call behavioral forecasting errors.79  When approaching a
decision, we think about what we ought to do—based on ethical com-
mitments, professionalism, codes of conduct, and so on.  But at the
time of decision, different motivations kick in and we are more likely
to do something in our self-interest, as opposed to the ethical option.80
The ethical dimensions of the decision fade in the moment.  Then, in
74. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV.
113 (1996).
75. See Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 2, at 231–33.
76. Varda Liberman, Steven M. Samuels & Lee Ross, The Name of the Game: Predictive
Power of Reputations Versus Situational Labels in Determining Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Moves, 30 PERSON. & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1175 (2004).
77. The same study was run on a group of Israeli fighter pilots, and in that study their flight
instructors had been asked to make predictions in advance concerning the cooperativeness of
their students.  The instructors’ predictions turned out to have no validity whatsoever, despite
extensive knowledge of their students’ decision-making derived from hours of intense training.
However, the framing as Bursa (the Hebrew word for marketplace) or Kommuna (community)
had the same effect as it did on American college students. See id. at 1179–80.
78. BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 2, at 19, 45.
79. Id. at 63.
80. Id. at 69–70.
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hindsight, in order to justify the action to ourselves, “we find ways to
internally ‘spin’ this behavior . . . [by] casting unethical actions in a
more positive light.”81  For most actors there is generally some frame
available as a justification,82 but nowhere is this more true than with
respect to judges, who can almost always appeal to legal arguments
favoring the position of the party for whom they decide.
B. Evidence of Bounded Ethicality in Judicial Decision-making
This process was illustrated in Caperton where there was a non-friv-
olous argument supporting the defendant’s position.  If Justice Benja-
min’s decision was unconsciously influenced by gratitude toward Don
Blankenship or the desire to receive future financial support, he
would still be able to fall back—again, unconsciously—on the briefs
and arguments of the defendant in the case.  Thus, he would be able to
maintain a conception of himself as an ethical judge, capable of ex-
cluding irrelevant considerations from his deliberations.
Judges have considerable training and experience in critically evalu-
ating evidence, and may as a result believe themselves capable of ful-
filling their professional commitment to decide cases impartially.  In
an important study, however, a trio of scholars including a cognitive
psychologist and a federal magistrate judge, showed that judges are no
better than jurors at disregarding inadmissible evidence, even when
specifically reminded that the information is inadmissible.83  Judges
tend to agree with the assessment of Learned Hand, that cautionary
instructions telling jurors to ignore inadmissible evidence requires
“mental gymnastic[s]” beyond the ability of jurors to perform.84  In
fact, mock jury studies have found that instructions to ignore evidence
may actually exacerbate the effect of the excluded evidence.  In one
study, mock jurors awarded more to a plaintiff after hearing evidence
that the defendant had insurance coverage and being told to disregard
it, as compared with a control group that did not hear evidence of
insurance coverage and, more surprisingly, another control group that
81. Id. at 74.
82. See, e.g., Thagard, supra note 2, at 368–69 (describing incident where city administrator
played a pivotal role in approving a contract with a financing company that obligated the city to
pay $227 million (Canadian) over 30 years, instead of the $112 million the city council had ap-
proved; when faced with allegations of corruption for having attended a hockey game and a golf
tournament in Florida with the financing company’s vice-president, the city administrator noted
that he had been instructed by the city council “to build relationships with potential partners”).
83. See Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inad-
missible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251
(2005).
84. Id. at 1254 (quoting Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932)).
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heard the evidence without objection.85  Although subsequent experi-
ments led to outcomes that diverge in some respects, many studies
find that “attempting to ignore inadmissible information might back-
fire or rebound, with the paradoxical result that the inadmissible in-
formation becomes more influential than it would have been in the
absence of such an attempt.”86  When it comes to their own abilities,
judges are considerably more optimistic and may, for example, be less
strict with the rules of evidence in bench trials.87  It makes sense to
trust judges to ignore inadmissible evidence due to their specialized
training and experience in making legal decisions.88  In other words,
reliance on the principle of professionalism may be warranted.
The mock juror studies suggest, however, that a judge who con-
sciously tries to hold aside the influence of a relationship with a liti-
gant (Justice Scalia in Cheney) or a campaign contribution (Justice
Benjamin in Caperton) may have a more difficult time judging the
case impartially.  This difficulty is the result of several psychological
mechanisms, including the fact that the effort to suppress one’s aware-
ness of a thought requires constant self-monitoring, such that the
thought is always present in one’s mind.89  Try not to think about a
white bear.  Trying not to think about a white bear only makes it
harder not to think about a white bear, because one is expending a
great deal of cognitive effort on a white-bear-related task.  Addition-
ally, as information is acquired, it influences how we process, assess,
and integrate new information.90  People may have great difficulty for-
getting or undoing the effect of knowledge that is acquired and
quickly incorporated into an existing belief system.91
Information triggers a cascade of thoughts as part of the brain’s
effort to construct and to maintain a coherent set of beliefs.  Merely
ignoring the information itself is not enough. The inferences that
explain and accommodate the information into an integrated pic-
ture of the world must also be ignored, or the information will affect
decision making indirectly.92
As a result of these and other mechanisms which operate largely un-
consciously, judges have difficulty ignoring inadmissible evidence such
85. Id. at 1270–71 (citing Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L.
REV. 744, 753–54 (1959)).
86. Id. at 1276.
87. Id. at 1256.
88. Id. at 1277.
89. Wistrich et al., supra note 83, at 1262–63.
90. Id. at 1265.
91. Id. at 1267–68.
92. Id. at 1269.
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as a settlement offer previously made by one of the parties.93  The
most probable explanation is not that judges refuse to follow the law,
but that they are human too, and like other humans have great diffi-
culty ignoring information they are instructed to disregard.94  Al-
though the authors did not consider campaign contributions in a case
like Caperton, it stands to reason that a judge would have similar diffi-
culty setting aside her feelings of gratitude toward a significant finan-
cial supporter.
IV. MODELING JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION PROVISIONS ON
ATTORNEY CONFLICTS RULES
The question is, of course, what should regulators do about the pos-
sibility that judges are unconsciously influenced by campaign contri-
butions.  The Code of Judicial Conduct sets out numerous instances in
which disqualification will be required, but the overarching norm is
that a judge should not participate in any proceeding in which her
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.95  This test is an objec-
tive one,96 so my criticism is not based on the mistaken belief that
judges must disqualify themselves only when they subjectively believe
they cannot be impartial.  Rather, the problem is that even this objec-
tive test is designed to be mostly self-executing, applied by the judges
themselves, to determine whether a hypothetical fully-informed ob-
server would entertain significant doubt about the judge’s impartial-
ity.97  The test may be objective in theory, but in application it may be
susceptible to the same cognitive errors that create the risk that cam-
paign contributions will undermine judicial impartiality.  Debra Bas-
sett has argued, correctly in my view, that these unconscious biases are
sufficiently pervasive to call into question the procedure under which
judges rule on disqualification motions.98  I would only add that many
instances of potentially disqualifying biases are never litigated in dis-
93. Id. at 1291–92.  The study also reports similar effects from inadmissible evidence such as
attorney-client privileged communications, the sexual history of the complaining witness in a
rape prosecution, a defendant’s prior criminal conviction, information obtained from a cooperat-
ing defendant and subsequently used against the defendant at sentencing, evidence obtained
from a search without probable cause (which may not be considered in determining whether, ex
ante, the police had probable cause for the search), and an inadmissible confession. See id. at
1294–1322.
94. Wistrich et al., supra note 83, at 1323–24.
95. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.11(A).
96. GEYH et al., supra note 20, § 4.05 at 4–13.
97. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters. Again, 30 REV. LITIG.
671, 708 (2011) (noting that judicial disqualification procedure assumes that judges can evaluate
their own bias).
98. Bassett, supra note 67, at 669–72.
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qualification motions, either because the parties do not know about
the conflict of interest or because they are reluctant to risk angering
the judge by taking an action that may be understood as an attack on
the judge’s integrity.
For this reason, I believe the approach to judicial disqualification
requires changing the framing of the decision.  Focusing on the judge’s
impartiality suggests that the judge is somehow a wrongdoer.  This di-
rectly challenges the judge’s self-conception as ethical and competent.
Judges are ethically obligated to set aside irrelevant considerations,
and after serving for some time on the bench may believe that they
are good at it.  A suggestion that a judge is not ethical or competent
triggers unconscious processes that suppress the effect of a competing
connection or interest, such as a significant campaign contribution.
The judge will be motivated to downplay the significance of that con-
sideration in her decision-making process, just as Justice Scalia
mocked the suggestion that his friendship with Vice President Cheney
would have any effect on his decision in the underlying litigation.  The
process of self-scrutiny itself is enough to set into motion unconscious
processes that give rise to the belief that a decision is unbiased.99
Attorney conflicts rules, by contrast, do not rely on a presumption
that the attorney in question will be unable to set aside the influence
of another client relationship or a personal interest.  The rules instead
are implied from the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relation-
ship, which carries with it the need for the strictest safeguards to en-
sure the lawyer’s loyalty and exclusive commitment to the client’s
interests.  As a fiduciary, an attorney must be willing to accept con-
straints that overprotect the values of loyalty, confidentiality, and in-
dependence.  From the point of view of behavioral psychology, the
framing of attorney conflicts rules does not assume inability to set
aside conflicting interests.  Rather, it is a principle along the lines of
“Caesar’s wife must be above suspicion.”  Correct application of the
attorney conflicts rules avoids inquiring into the actual ability of a law-
yer to fulfill duties owed to the client.  As a result, an attorney’s deci-
sion to decline a representation due to a conflict of interest does not
signal that the attorney is a wrongdoer.  This approach to handling
conflicts of interest avoids framing the decision in a way that triggers
unconscious processes of self-defense that tend to create ethical blind
spots.  A judge would simply decide whether the facts warrant a rea-
sonable person concluding there is a risk that some judge—not neces-
99. Id. at 672–73 (citing Melinda A. Marbes, Refocusing Recusals: How the Bias Blind Spot
Affects Disqualification Disputes and Should Reshape Recusal Reform, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 235, 250 (2013)).
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sarily the judge in question—might succumb to the temptation to be
influenced in a decision.  The subtle but important difference between
this approach and existing judicial disqualification procedure is that
the judge would not be making a determination that she is the type of
person who could not resist temptation.  The hypothetical decision
frame is faithful to the objective standard underlying the Code of Judi-
cial Conduct’s disqualification provisions, but may help mitigate the
unconscious tendency to see one’s own ethical character in the best
light.
One objection to this procedure is that attorney conflicts rules regu-
late fairly broadly, and may cut against any “duty to sit” that charac-
terizes judicial ethics.  Broad rules can also be overinclusive, and
judges may be troubled by the number of cases that require recusa-
tion.  In the attorney conflicts rules, Model Rule 1.7 does not create a
per se rule of disqualification from any representation in which the
interests of the client is somehow adverse to another client, or the
attorney’s personal interests.  Rather, the party seeking disqualifica-
tion for a conflict of interest must show a substantial likelihood of a
material limitation on the attorney’s ability to provide competent and
diligent representation to the affected client.100  Nevertheless, if judi-
cial ethics adopted something like the attorney conflicts model for
regulating disqualification, many of the questions posed by Chief Jus-
tice Roberts in his Caperton dissent would have to be addressed.101
For example does it matter whether the contributor is not a party to
the case, but has interests that will be affected by the decision?102
Should we assume that a judge feels hostility toward an opponent of a
financial supporter?103  Are contributions by executives of a corpora-
tion imputed to their employer?104
In any event, the contemporary function of the duty to sit is to sim-
ply remind judges that if they are not duty-bound to disqualify them-
selves, they should not step aside merely for reasons of personal
convenience.105  The mandatory provisions of state codes of judicial
conduct, the federal recusal statute, and the requirement of the Due
Process Clause, all show that judicial disqualification is not an aberra-
tion, but is a common procedure that ensures the impartiality of the
judge who eventually decides the litigants’ case.  The need to address
100. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2).
101. See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 893–98.
102. Id. at 894 (question 11).
103. Id. at 895 (question 18).
104. Id. at 897 (question 29).
105. See GEYH et al., supra note 20 §4.03, at 4–11.
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Chief Justice Roberts’ questions does not discourage adoption of the
risk-avoidance approach.  Suppose, contrary to history, that attorney
conflicts rules did not evolve organically, but one day state courts all
adopted, by fiat, a prohibition on the representation of a client where
the representation would be materially limited by the lawyer’s respon-
sibilities to another client.106  A number of Roberts-style questions
would arise: Would there be a conflict if the effective representation
of Client A required the cross-examination of Client B, currently be-
ing represented in an unrelated matter?107  If Client A and Client B
are co-defendants in civil litigation, is there a conflict?108  What if Cli-
ent A is Coke and Client B is Pepsi, but the representation of both
does not involve a Coke versus Pepsi litigated matter—do the adverse
economic interests of the clients create a conflict of interest?109  Sup-
pose a law firm is representing Client A and suing a wholly owned
subsidiary of Client A on behalf of Client B—is that a conflict?110  If a
law firm represents a class of plaintiffs, can another lawyer in the firm
sue an unnamed class member?111  Can a law firm represent the buyer
and seller simultaneously in a simple real estate closing?112  How
about a more complex commercial real estate transaction?113  Would a
conflict arise if one lawyer in a firm possessed confidential informa-
tion of Client A, and that information could be used to the detriment
of Client A.114  All of these, and many other questions have arisen in
the course of applying the “material limitation” standard to attorney
conflicts.  While some of the questions are easily answered, others
present thorny issues that are still vigorously debated in disqualifica-
tion proceedings.  The corporate-affiliate issue, for example, has gen-
erated an awe-inspiring body of case law and bar association
106. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2).
107. Answer: yes. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 6.
108. Answer: maybe, depending on the defenses that may be asserted, settlement postures of
the clients, possible cross-claims, and so on. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt.
23.
109. Answer: no. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 6.
110. Answer: it depends. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 34.
111. Answer: yes. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 25.
112. Answer: maybe, with consent; but it is clear that the conflicts rules apply to non-litigation
representation. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmts. 26, 29.
113. Answer: no way. See, e.g., Baldasarre v. Butler, 625 A.2d 458, 467 (N.J. 1993).
114. Answer: heck yes. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmts. 19, 31; see also A
v. B, 726 A.2d 924 (N.J. 1999) (law firm that represented husband and wife in preparation of
joint estate-planning documents had a conflict resulting from simultaneous representation, by
other firm lawyers, of the husband’s girlfriend in a paternity action, where existence of girlfriend
and husband’s illegitimate child were unknown to the wife).
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opinions.115  The point is, simply, that application questions will al-
ways arise with respect to a legal standard stated in general terms.
That does not mean the standard is unworkable, only that its precise
contours will develop over time, as it is applied by courts in the variety
of factual situations.
There is a well-developed body of case law dealing with similar
questions applicable to federal judges, under the federal disqualifica-
tion statute.116  Chief Justice Roberts asks, how long does a presump-
tion of bias last?117  One federal court decision held that a judge was
not required to recuse himself based on his social relationship with a
party that ended eight years prior to sentencing.118  Similarly, the
Chief Justice wonders, “What if the case involves a social or ideologi-
cal issue rather than a financial one?  Must a judge recuse from cases
involving, say, abortion rights if he has received ‘disproportionate’
support from individuals who feel strongly about either side of that
issue?”119  Guidance may be found in cases involving pro-choice
judges presiding over lawsuits brought by pro-life organizations,120
and vice-versa.  What if the judge disagrees with the tactics used by
the organization?121  If the disagreement pertains to conduct within
the proceedings, the extrajudicial source rule states that “determina-
tions of bias or partiality cannot be based on opinions, rulings, or inci-
dents arising out of the course of the proceedings in question.”122
Again, the point is simply that application questions pertaining to risk-
avoidance rules can be worked out over time as issues are raised in
connection with specific disputes.
115. See, e.g., GSI Commerce Solutions, Inc. v. BabyCenter, L.L.C., 618 F.3d 204, 210–12 (2d
Cir. 2010); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Argonaut Ins., 264 F. Supp. 2d 914, 922–24 (N.D.
Cal. 2003); Discotrade v. Wyeth-Ayerst Int’l Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 355, 358–361 (S.D.N.Y. 2002);
JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22–24 (S.D.N.Y. 2002);
Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Hancock, Rothert & Bunshoft, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 425 (Ct. App. 1999);
Brooklyn Navy Yard Cogeneration Partners, LP v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 419 (Ct.
App. 1997); Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. v. Sprint Publ’g and Advert., Inc., 1996 WL 99902
(N.D. Ill. 1996); Stratagem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int’l N.V., 756 F. Supp. 789, 792–794 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 534, 535, 539–542
(S.D.N.Y.1989); ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-390 (1995);
N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 2007-03.
116. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012).
117. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 894 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (question 7).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 817 (2d Cir.1992), overruled on other
grounds as stated in United States v. Yousef, 750 F.3d 254, 261 (2d Cir. 2014).
119. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 894 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (Question 9).
120. See, e.g., Lasko v. American Bd. of Surgery, 47 F. Supp. 3d 1122 (D. Nev. 2014), vacated
on other grounds, 92 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (D. Nev. 2015).
121. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 895 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (Question 17).
122. Piester v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 929 F. Supp. 595 (D.R.I. 1996) (quoting Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994)).
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V. CONCLUSION
The modification of the existing judicial-recusal doctrine to incorpo-
rate the risk-avoidance approach of attorney conflicts law is a modest
one.  In most cases, the results are likely to be the same as under cur-
rent law.  The difference is the evaluative frame the judge is being
asked to take up with respect to her own conduct.  Well-known psy-
chological tendencies create blind spots when someone is asked to
evaluate her propensity to engage in wrongdoing.  We have a strong
tendency to view ourselves as competent, ethical, and deserving.  In
addition, mechanisms of cognitive dissonance reduction operate at an
unconscious level to exclude consideration of evidence that would
tend to upset this self-conception.  To the extent judicial disqualifica-
tion law should be self-administered by judges, rather than requiring
evaluation by a neutral decision-maker, it should require judges to
think in terms of objectively stated risks to impartial adjudication, in
contrast with the current approach that asks whether a judge may sub-
jectively be unable to be impartial.
